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Preface 
In most European countries, self-employment (outside of agriculture) has been 
increasing since the 1980s. This has been accompanied in most countries by a 
growing number of ‘new self-employed’, many of whom have come directly from 
unemployment and set up small companies in the service sector with only a small 
amount of capital. It is also associated with a stronger labour market dynamic, so that 
more frequent transitions into and out of self-employment are becoming an element in 
the employment histories of a growing share of each national population. This has 
created new challenges for labour market and social policy. It raises the question of 
whether and to what extent the social insurance system for the self-employed in the 
individual countries is working and is capable of dealing with the new situation. 
This question about the provision of social protection for the self-employment is 
the starting-point for a project entitled ‘The new self-employed in European 
perspective: the structure, dynamic, promotion and social protection of the new self-
employment’, which is being supported by the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. The project has 
been running at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin since May 2004. It is being directed 
by Günther Schmid and Karin Schulze Buschoff and will run for two years. Germany, 
Great Britain, the Netherlands, Italy and Sweden comprise the group of countries 
selected in order to investigate self-employment in the context of different welfare state 
regimes. In addition to quantitative/statistical analyses of the structure and dynamic of 
self-employment in these countries, a methodology based on expert interviews and 
country studies will also be adopted as a means of fully capturing social protection. In 
particular, this method should provide information on national institutional 
arrangements and problem situations that cannot be captured by means of 
representative surveys. The following paper by Monique Aerts is one of the five country 
studies that describe in detail the national social insurance systems for the self-
employed and compare them with the systems for dependent employees. It is also 
planned to use the country studies as a basis for a comparative five-country study 
(Social Security in Europe in Comparative Perspective). 
Karin Schulze Buschoff 
Abstract 
In the Netherlands the self-employed are insured against a number of social risks 
through social security provisions and residence-based social insurances. The self-
employed are, for example, insured against the risk of old age: like every other Dutch 
resident, they receive a pension under the General Old-Age Pensions Act when they 
turn 65. In certain situations the self-employed are like every other Dutch resident 
entitled to benefits under the General Supplementary Benefits Act. The self-employed 
also are insured for the costs of healthcare through the Health Insurance Act and the 
General Exceptional Medical Expenses Act. But though they probably are protected 
and compensated at a higher level in the Netherlands than in most other European 
countries, the self-employed nevertheless are protected against these risks to a lesser 
extent than employees are. In theory, the self-employed are even excluded from the 
employee insurance schemes, though in practice they do have some access to these 
insurances. In the past the self-employed had their own employment-based insurance 
schemes, such as the Act on Income Provisions for Older, Partially Disabled Formerly 
Self-Employed Persons and the Self-Employed Persons Disablement Insurance Act. 
These insurances protected them against the risks of incapacity for work due to illness, 
disability or old age. The self-employed were also insured against the risks of 
parenthood, as they enjoyed the right to a paid maternity leave under the General Work 
and Care Act.  
On 1 August 2004 these three social insurances for the self-employed were 
abolished because the Dutch government maintained that the social risks faced by the 
self-employed are easier to insure against on the private market than are the risks 
faced by employees. It thus decided to leave the risks faced by the self-employed to 
the private insurance market. This decision conforms with a larger trend in the 
Netherlands, the trend of reconstructing or privatising the social security system. 
Zusammenfassung 
In den Niederlanden sind Selbstständige durch die Sozialversicherungssysteme gegen 
eine Reihe sozialer Risiken abgesichert. So sind sie zum Beispiel  in der 
Altersrentenversicherung abgesichert und erhalten wie jeder andere niederländische 
Einwohner, wenn sie das 65. Lebensjahr erreicht haben, eine Rente nach dem 
“General Old-Age Pensions Act” (Gesetz zur Regelung der Altersrente). Unter 
bestimmten Umständen sind Selbstständige auch berechtigt, Leistungen nach dem 
“General Supplementary Benefits Act” (Gesetz über zusätzliche Sozialleistungen) zu 
erhalten. Darüber hinaus sind sie ebenfalls in der Gesundheitsversorgung abgesichert 
(durch den “Health Insurance Act” und den “General Exceptional Medical Expenses 
Act”). Obwohl sie wahrscheinlich besser gegen soziale Risiken abgesichert sind als 
Selbstständige in anderen europäischen Ländern, sind sie auf einem niedrigeren 
Niveau abgesichert als abhängig Beschäftigte. Theoretisch sind die Selbstständigen 
von Versicherungssystemen für abhängig Beschäftigte ausgeschlossen, aber in der 
Praxis haben sie häufig Zugang zu diesen Systemen gefunden. In der Vergangenheit 
hatten Selbstständige ihre eigenen einkommensbasierten Versicherungssysteme, wie 
den “Act on Income Provisions for Older, Partially Disabled Formerly Self-employed 
People” (Gesetz über die Bereitstellung von Einkommen für ältere und teilweise 
arbeitsunfähige vormals selbstständige Personen) und den “Self-Employment Persons 
Disablement Insurance Act” (Gesetz über die Arbeitsunfähigkeitsversicherung für 
Selbstständige). Diese Versicherungen schützten sie gegen das Risiko der 
Arbeitsunfähigkeit infolge von Krankheiten, Behinderung oder Alter. Die 
Selbstständigen waren auch bei Elternschaft abgesichert, sie genossen das Recht auf 
bezahlten Mutterschaftsurlaub (nach dem “General Work and Care Act”).  
Am 1. August 2004 wurden diese drei Gesetze zur sozialen Sicherung von 
Selbstständigen abgeschafft. Die niederländische Regierung vertrat den Standpunkt, 
dass die sozialen Risiken, für Selbstständige einfacher über den privaten Markt 
abzusichern sind als die für abhängig Beschäftigte. Deshalb wurde entschieden, die 
Absicherung der sozialen Risiken Selbstständiger dem privaten Versicherungsmarkt zu 
überlassen. Diese Entscheidung geht einher mit einem weitergehenden Trend in den 
Niederlanden, den Umbau und der Privatisierung des sozialen Sicherungssystems.  
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Introduction  
In most European countries a sharp distinction is made between employees and self-
employed persons with respect to social security. Of course, the social security 
regimes of the different European countries do vary, but a general principle of these 
regimes is that employees are always protected better than self-employed persons. 
This distinction between employees and self-employed persons has a historical basis. 
In theory, at least, employees enjoy social security and the self-employed do not, 
because the social risks of employees are considered to be collective risks—risks that 
society should protect against—whereas the social risks of the self-employed are 
considered to be individual risks, or risks that society need not protect against (Schmid 
& Schömann 2004). In practice, however, self-employed persons in the Netherlands do 
enjoy social security, though not to the extent that employees do. 
In the Netherlands the industrial revolution took off in the late nineteenth century, 
introducing new forms and means of industrial production (a Taylor-Fordist 
organisational model). In this new environment dependent employment, in which the 
employee is subordinate to the employer, became widespread and thus the dominant 
legal form for exchanging personal labour for financial remuneration. Today dependent 
employment is still the dominant legal form in the Netherlands. Labour law governs 
dependent employment. However, back then, around the turn of the twentieth century, 
some workers stayed away from the factories, worked from their own workshops and 
never became dependent on or subordinate to an employer. This more traditional legal 
form for exchanging personal labour for financial remuneration is called self-
employment. Self-employed persons are often professionals active in occupations 
which—whilst not conforming to the Taylor-Fordist organisational model—are governed 
by the principles of civil and commercial law (Perulli 2003: 6). This distinction between 
legal contracts of labour goes back even further than the industrial revolution, having 
first been made in ancient Roman law. Roman law is the common feature of the legal 
systems in the different European countries (Jansen 2003). 
This distinction between dependent employment and self-employment is 
recognised in most European countries and is regarded as being clear-cut. Employees 
work on the basis of a labour contract, whereas the self-employed work on the basis of 
a service contract. In reality, the distinction between employees and self-employed 
persons is not at all clear-cut. In fact, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the self-
employed from employees, because often they do the same work and work under the 
same circumstances and on the basis of the same conditions. Often the only clear 
distinction between the self-employed and employees is their legal status (Heijden 
1997). There is evidence that one of three self-employed persons is a pseudo 
employee (Zwinkels 2000). 
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This paper examines the Dutch social insurance system and the various social 
insurance schemes for the self-employed. The first section provides an introduction to 
the self-employed in the Netherlands, describes trends in self-employment and 
discusses the grey areas between employees and the self-employed. The following 
section presents general information on the Dutch social security system and describes 
how this social security system was constructed and is now being reconstructed. It also 
focuses on the structure of this regime and the scope of the employee insurance 
schemes. The third section describes the employee insurance schemes for dealing 
with the economic risks of sickness and disability, parenthood, old age and 
unemployment. The fourth section examines the insurance schemes for these same 
risks for the self-employed. The next section discusses certain aspects of the social 
security system in practice, in particular the borderline between employees and self-
employed persons, and examines the recent shift in mandatory regulations from 
protecting to not hindering the self-employed. The sixth and last section presents some 
concluding remarks. 
1 Trends in self-employment  
More and more people in the Netherlands are now combining dependent employment 
with self-employment, either simultaneously or consecutively. A growing number are 
even leaving their jobs to start their own companies. This trend began in the 1970s and 
peaked in the 1990s. The increase in self-employment in non-traditional sectors like 
construction, education, healthcare, information and communication technology, 
financial services, personal services and transport was conspicuous. In this period 
about 30,000 people per year started their own company; the trend peaked in 2001, 
when, in the course of one year, over 40,000 people started up their own business 
(Hessels & Vroonhof 2003). 
The term ‘self-employed without staff’ (zelfstandige zonder personeel -zzp’er) 
came into use during the 1990s. It originates from the construction industry, a sector 
that showed a strong increase in self-employment in the 1990s. The number of self-
employed without staff in this economic sector increased by 86% from 17,405 in 1993 
to 32,425 in 2000. This explosive growth can be attributed to economic trends, such as 
the overstrained labour market; changes in management models, such as those 
making use of subcontracting and outsourcing; and changes in government policy, 
such as the abolition of certain licenses (Scholman 2001: 22; Hessels & Vroonhof 
2003). 
Nowadays the number of self-employed without staff is stabilising. In the traditional 
economic sector of agriculture the number of self-employed people is even declining. 
Despite a more positive attitude towards self-employment, the Dutch still prefer a 
stable, long-term subordinate employment relationship with one employer. In fact, the 
average employee works about nine years for the same employer (Schnabel 2001). 
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Other forms of flexible labour, such as part-time work (which creates flexibility for the 
employee) and temporary agency work (which creates flexibility for the employer), are 
more common than self-employment in the Netherlands. 
Table 1: Active workforce in the Netherlands 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total 7,946,000 8,124,000 8,291,000 8,325,000 8,294,000 
Employees 6,789,000 6,969,000 7,124,000 7,166,000 7,141,000 
Self-employed persons  1,148,000 1,155,000 1,167,000 1,159,000 1,153,000 
Source: Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, Sociaal-economische trends, 2e kwartaal 2005, 2005. 
As shown in Table 1, about 14% of the active workforce—here comprising everyone 
who works 12 hours or more per week—is self-employed. This data from the Central 
Office for Statistics (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek) include traditional sectors such as 
the agricultural sector, and no distinction is made as to whether or not the self-
employed employ staff. According to a study comparing European countries, the 
number of self-employed persons is about 9.7% of the active workforce, excluding the 
agricultural sector. Again, no distinction is made between self-employed with staff and 
self-employed without staff. Only 33% of self-employed persons employ staff and are 
considered employers. Thus, 66% of the self-employed can be regarded as self-
employed persons without staff. Approximately 6.5% of the active workforce, or 
540,000 persons, are self-employed persons without staff (Schulze Buschoff 2004: 22–
23; Perulli 2003). 
The number of self-employed persons is higher in the Netherlands than in 
Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Scandinavian countries and even Great Britain. On 
the other hand, in Belgium, Ireland and the Mediterranean countries the number of self-
employed persons is much higher than in the Netherlands. The relatively high number 
of self-employed persons in the Netherlands can be traced to the strong growth of the 
Dutch service sector (Hessels & Vroonhof 2003: 37). There are good reasons why 
about 60% of Dutch self-employed persons work in this sector (Schulze Buschoff 2004: 
26). The service sector is very labour-intensive, yet has low start-up costs. A self-
employed person only needs a few investments, such as a computer, a telephone and 
a car, to start a business. But the most important explanation for the high percentage of 
self-employed is the favourable financial infrastructure of the Netherlands. It is 
relatively easy for self-employed persons to get a bank loan to start up their own 
venture. In addition, the tax authority supports the self-employed as entrepreneurs 
through several kinds of tax regulations and reductions in tax. 
Research shows that in the Netherlands most self-employed people enter the 
labour market as an employee and decide to start their own company later on in their 
career. Two-thirds of all self-employed persons were employees before they started up 
their own business. The average age of the self-employed is 45 years, which is much 
higher than the average age of employees (Hessels & Vroonhof 2003: 56). Relatively 
more older workers, and more older male workers than older female workers, are 
active on the labour market as self-employed persons. In 2004, about 18% of the active 
workforce between the ages of 50 and 74 were self-employed. For the age groups 55 
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to 59, 60 to 64, and 65 to 74, the share of the active workforce that was self-employed 
was 17%, 33% and 60%, respectively (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek 2005: 14). 
2 General information about social protection in the 
Netherlands 
Social security is a system of income protection that provides income security in 
situations of income loss or lack of income due to circumstances like sickness, 
disability, incapacity for work, unemployment and old age. In addition to this protective 
function, social security has a preventive function: the social security system also 
attempts to prevent people from leaving the labour market definitively by reintegrating 
the unemployed and those who have not been able to work into the labour market. 
Social security is based on solidarity, and, in the modern welfare state, the nation-state 
is responsible for implementing the social security system. It took the Dutch 
government 75 years to construct a social security system, which reached its peak in 
the 1970s. Since then, the government has been reconstructing and reforming the 
social security system at a rapid pace (Noordam 2004: 25–27). 
2.1 Constructing and reconstructing the social security regime 
The construction of the Dutch social security system began in the second half of the 
nineteenth century with the introduction of unemployment benefits and pension 
schemes for civil servants and the implementation of the Poverty Act in 1854. With the 
establishment of the poverty act, relief for the poor became a task for the Dutch 
government rather than one for the churches. 
 
1854 Poverty Act 
1901 Work Injury Act 
1913  Sickness Benefit Act (ZW) 
1913 Disability Act  
1939 Child Allowance Act 
1949  Unemployment Benefit Act (WW) 
1956  General Old-Age Pensions Act (AOW) 
1959  General Widows and Orphans Act  
1962 General Child Benefit Act (AKW) 
1964 Health Insurance Act (ZFW) 
1965 General Supplementary Benefits Act (ABW) 
1967 Occupational Disablement Insurance Act (WAO) 
1968 General Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) 
1976 General Disability Benefit Act (AAW) 
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Over the course of the social security system’s construction, certain acts were 
modernised or replaced by other acts. For example, in 1921 and again in 1927 the 
Work Injury Act was modernised, and in 1967 the Work Injury Act, together with the 
Disability Act, was replaced by the Occupational Disablement Insurance Act (WAO). 
The expansion of the social security system reached its ‘peak’ with the implementation 
of the General Disability Benefit Act (AAW) in 1976. This AAW ‘replaced’ the WAO by 
reducing it to a supplementary insurance for employees. 
During the last two decades of the twentieth century the social security system has 
undergone a series of rapid changes. The Dutch government has pursued 
modernisation and privatisation measures in its efforts to reconstruct the system. In 
1980 the General Child Benefit Act (AKW) was modernised, as were the 
Unemployment Benefit Act (WW) in 1968 and the General Supplementary Benefits Act 
(ABW) in 1996 and again in 2004. Choosing the ‘third way,’ the Dutch government has 
shifted its role from protecting people to enabling people, from provider of social 
security to regulator of social security. Nowadays the Dutch government leaves an 
increasing share of the social insurances to the social partners or, if possible, to the 
market of private insurance companies. The Dutch state is no longer the sole provider 
of social security. The government still regulates the social security system, however, 
and if private insurance companies consider a particular social risk uninsurable, the 
government considers it its task to insure against this risk. 
 
1986 Act on Income Provisions for Older, Partially Disabled Unemployed 
Persons (IOAW) 
1987 Act on Income Provisions for Older, Partially Disabled Formerly Self-
Employed Persons (IOAZ) 
1996 Act on Extending Payment of Wages in Case of Sickness 
1996 General Surviving Relatives Act (ANW) 
1998 Occupational Disablement Insurance Act (WAO) 
1998 Occupational Disablement Assistance Act for Handicapped Young 
Persons (WAJONG) 
1998  Self-Employed Persons Disablement Insurance Act (WAZ) 
1998 Act on Income Provision for Artists (WIK) 
2001 General Work and Care Act
2002 Gatekeeper Act 
2002 Improved Gatekeeper Act 
2002 Statement of Work Relationship (VAR) 
2003 Act on Abolition of Follow-up Unemployment Benefit 
2004 Act on the Extension Period of Continued Wage Payment During 
Sickness 
2005 Act on Extending the Effects of the Statement of Work Relationship 
2005 Act on Work and Income Provision for Artists (WWIK) 
 
The Sickness Benefit Act (ZW) was ‘privatised’ in 1994 and again in 1996 with the 
implementation of the Act on Extending Payment of Wages in Case of Sickness, 
thereby giving employers financial responsibility for their employees in the event of 
illness. In 1996 the General Widows and Orphans Act was replaced by the General 
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Surviving Relatives Act (ANW). The difference between the two is that, unlike the 
General Widows and Orphans Act, the ANW is means-tested. A major reform, which is 
connected with the ‘privatisation’ of the Sickness Benefit Act, took place in 1998 when 
the General Disability Benefit Act (AAW) was replaced by the Occupational 
Disablement Insurance Act (WAO), the Occupational Disablement Assistance Act for 
Handicapped Young Persons (WAJONG) and the Self-Employed Persons Disablement 
Insurance Act (WAZ).1 In addition to this change, the way in which the WAO is financed 
was changed drastically. 
2.2 The structure of the Dutch social security system 
In the Netherlands a distinction is made between social security provisions and social 
insurances. The Poverty Act of 1854 was the first Dutch social security provision. The 
Work Injury Act of 1901 was the first Dutch social insurance. The difference between 
social security provisions and social insurances is that they are financed differently. 
Social security provisions are financed by the Dutch government, whereas social 
insurances are financed by the beneficiaries themselves—whether employees, self-
employed persons or residents. Nevertheless, the Dutch government sets the level of 
contributions for the social insurances (Noordam 2004: 33). 
Social security provisions 
All residents of the Netherlands are entitled to social security provisions, which provide 
security in the form of a basic income provision. If his or her circumstances justify it, 
every resident of the Netherlands can make use of these social security provisions, 
which include the General Supplementary Benefits Act, the Act on Work and Income 
Provision for Artists (WWIK), the Act on Income Provisions for Older, Partially Disabled 
Unemployed Persons (IOAW), the Act on Income Provisions for Older, Partially 
Disabled Formerly Self-Employed Persons (IOAZ) and the Occupational Disablement 
Assistance Act for Handicapped Young Persons. These social security provisions apply 
if a Dutch resident is unemployed or otherwise unable to work due to an incapacity. 
The General Supplementary Benefits Act applies to all residents, whereas the other 
social security provisions apply only to specific groups, such as artists, employees, the 
self-employed or young disabled persons. The General Child Benefit Act applies to 
every resident who is raising one or more children. 
                                                 
1 During the General Disability Benefit Act (AAW), which was implemented in 1976 and 
abolished in 1998, the WAO was only a supplementary insurance for employees on top of 
the AAW and with the abolition of the AAW the WAO again became the main employee 
insurance against the risk of incapacity for work. 
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Residence-based social insurances 
Some social insurances, such as the General Old-Age Pensions Act, the General 
Surviving Relatives Act and the General Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ), 
are residence-based. The contribution for these three social insurances comes from 
the payroll taxes and is levied, together with the wage tax, by the tax authorities. Like 
the social security provisions, the other residence-based social insurances are financed 
through income tax revenues but are not part of the payroll taxes. The Dutch income 
tax regime applies to every Dutch resident. It is a progressive, cumulative tax regime 
over the total income (e.g. employment, interest, assets), which consists of four income 
scales with their own tax percentage. For example, a person under the age of 65 who 
earns €30,000 per year pays a tax of 34.4% for the first €16,983 earned and a tax of 
41.95% for the remaining €13,017 earned. 
Table 2: The Dutch tax regime 
 Up to the age of 65 65 or older 
Scale 1: 
Income up to €16,893  
AOW 17.90% 
ANW 1.25% 
AWBZ 13.45% 
Wage tax 1.80% 
Total 34.40% 
AOW 0% 
ANW 1.25% 
AWBZ 13.45% 
Wage tax 1.80% 
Total 16.50% 
Scale 2: 
Income between €16,894 
and  
€30,357 
AOW 17.90% 
ANW 1.25% 
AWBZ 13.45% 
Wage tax 9.35% 
Total 41.95% 
AOW 0% 
ANW 1.25% 
AWBZ 13.45% 
Wage tax 9.35% 
Total 24.05% 
Scale 3: 
Income between €30,358 
and  
€51,762 
AOW 0% 
ANW 0% 
AWBZ 0% 
Wage tax 42% 
Total 42% 
AOW 0 % 
ANW 0 % 
AWBZ 0 % 
Wage tax 42 % 
Total 42 % 
Scale 4: 
Income from €51,763 and up 
AOW 0% 
ANW 0% 
AWBZ 0% 
Wage tax 52% 
Total 52% 
AOW 0% 
ANW 0% 
AWBZ 0% 
Wage tax 52% 
Total 52% 
Source: Tax authorities. 
Employment-based social insurances 
Other social insurances are employment-based, and some of these apply only to 
employees. The employee insurances schemes include the Sickness Benefit Act, the 
Occupational Disablement Insurance Act and the Unemployment Benefit Act. One 
employment-based social insurance applied only to the self-employed: the Self-
Employed Persons Disablement Insurance Act (WAZ), which was abolished in 2004. 
The Health Insurance Act (ZFW) used to be an employee insurance scheme, with both 
employee and employer paying the premiums for the scheme. Nowadays the ZFW also 
applies to most self-employed persons and most groups of retired workers. The ZFW 
has virtually become a residence-based social insurance. If a self-employed person or 
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a retired person is insured for the ZFW, he pays the premiums himself, including the 
employer’s share of the premium. 
The employment-based social insurances are financed mainly through social 
security contributions. The employers pay the contributions for the insurances 
established by the Sickness Benefit Act and the Occupational Disablement Insurance 
Act. Both employers and employees pay the contributions for the insurance from the 
Unemployment Benefit Act. The self-employed had paid the contributions for the WAZ 
themselves. In sum, 27.6% of the Dutch gross national product is spent on social 
security, which is what is spent on average in the European Union countries (Noordam 
2004: 51). 
Table 3: Costs of social security in 2003 (billions of euros)2
Social security benefits: 90,8 
Social security provisions: 9,7 Social insurances: 81,1 
ABW 4,7 
AKW 3,2 
IOAW/IOAZ 0,2 
WAJONG 1,6 
WWIK 0,03 
 
ZW 1,6 
WAO 12,1 
WAZ 0,6 
WW 6,4 
ZFW 16,1 
AWBZ 19,1 
AOW 23,1 
ANW 1,6 
Source: Noordam 2004: 51. 
Four pillars of social security 
The social security provisions and the social insurances together compensate for most 
social risks and labour-related risks, but they represent just the first two pillars of the 
Dutch social security regime. On top of these social security provisions and social 
insurances there is a third pillar, the supplementary pension schemes, which are the 
result of collective labour agreements. The fourth pillar of social security consists of 
private insurances. Since 2004 one employment-based social insurance, the Self-
Employed Persons Disablement Insurance Act (WAZ), has been abolished and left to 
the private insurance market. 
                                                 
2 Only the costs of the social security provisions and social insurances described in this paper 
are taken into account for table 3. 
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Table 4: Pillars of social security 
  Residents 
Social 
security 
provisions 
Family 
Incapacity for work 
Destitute 
AKW 
WAJONG (Young disabled persons only) 
ABW, IOAW, IOAZ (abolished in 1004), WWIK 
  Residents Employees Self-employed 
Social 
insurances 
Illness 
Incapacity for work 
Old age 
Surviving relatives 
Unemployment 
ZFW, AWBZ 
 
AOW 
ANW 
 
ZW, WAO  
 
 
WW 
 
WAZ (abolished in 
2004) 
 
Collective 
labour 
agreements 
Old age  Supplementary 
pension 
schemes of 
most groups of 
employees 
Supplementary 
pension schemes 
for some groups of 
self-employed 
Private 
insurances 
Incapacity for work   Occupational 
disability insurances 
Source: Noordam 2004: 37, 54. 
The risks that employment-based social insurances compensate for are risks closely 
related with being active on the labour market and involved in paid labour. The risks 
related with unpaid labour are excluded from the social insurances. This situation 
causes problems in particular for women who are not active on the labour market but 
choose to stay home and raise their children. If these women are unable to work, they 
do not receive any benefits. They also are excluded from entitlement to the General 
Work and Care Act, which deals with the combination of working and raising children 
(Noordam 2004: 37). The male breadwinner-model (i.e. the husband raises the income, 
the wife raises the children) has not vanished entirely in the Netherlands, though more 
and more women do work part time. 
Social security organisations  
Both the social security provisions and the social insurances are regulated by the state 
and uniform throughout the country. The Employee Insurance Implementing Body 
(UWV) is responsible for the administration of the employment-based social insurances 
that compensate for the labour-related risks of sickness, disability and employment, 
such as the Sickness Benefit Act, the Occupational Disablement Insurance Act, the 
Unemployment Benefit Act and the Self-Employed Persons Disablement Insurance 
Act. The UWV also is responsible for the administration of social security provisions 
like the Occupational Disablement Assistance Act for Handicapped Young Persons. 
The UWV must ensure that those employees and self-employed persons at risk receive 
the benefits to which they are entitled. The ultimate responsibility at government level 
for legislative and budgetary issues related to the employment-based social insurances 
and most of the social security provisions lies with the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment. The Social Insurance Bank is responsible for the administration of some 
social security provisions and social insurances, such as the General Child Benefit Act, 
the General Old-Age Pensions Act and the General Surviving Relatives Act. The 
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Health Care Insurance Board coordinates the implementation and funding of the Health 
Insurance Act (ZFW) and the General Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ). The 
Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sport determines policy for the ZFW and AWBZ 
insurances. The municipal social services are responsible for the administration of 
most social security provisions, such as the General Supplementary Benefits Act, the 
Act on Work and Income Provision for Artists, the Act on Income Provisions for Older, 
Partially Disabled or Unemployed Persons and the Act on Income Provisions for Older, 
Partially Disabled Formerly Self-Employed Persons. 
2.3 The scope of the employment-based social insurances  
In theory, only employees have access to employee insurance schemes like the 
Sickness Benefit Act, the Occupational Disablement Insurance Act and the 
Unemployment Benefit Act. The self-employed are excluded from these insurances 
schemes. In reality, however, some groups of self-employed persons have access to 
these social insurances, usually because of their background as an employee. Some 
groups of self-employed persons even have a supplementary pension fund on the 
basis of their profession. In addition, some self-employed persons, such as painters, 
metalworkers and steelworkers, fall under the scope of the trade unions and therefore 
have a supplementary pensions fund. In theory, it is possible for self-employed persons 
to fall under the scope of the trade unions of works council’s domain, just as employees 
do, but most trade unions and work councils ignore this possibility. The distinction 
between employees and self-employed persons is also diffused by the introduction of 
the notion of the fictitious employee. Athletes and artists, for example, are considered 
to be fictitious employees. 
Fictitious employees 
If a worker belongs to the scope of the social insurance schemes, the Sickness Benefit 
Act (ZW), the Occupational Disablement Insurance Act (WAO) and the Unemployment 
Benefit Act (WW) are mandatory. All employees belong to the scope of the social 
insurance schemes (Article 3 ZW, WAO and WW). Some workers are not officially 
considered employees because they do not work in a dependent employment 
relationship, yet their socio-economic position is very similar to the socio-economic 
position of employees. Thus, these workers, who are not employees, are considered 
employees as far as the employment-based social insurances are concerned. 
Classified as ‘fictitious employees’ for this purpose, this group includes certain 
contractors and their workers, people employed by intermediaries and their workers, 
certain fishermen, students and interns, silent partners, outworkers, musicians, artists, 
athletes and people who exchange personal labour for financial remuneration and work 
fewer than two days a week for the same employer and earn less than 40% of the 
minimum wage. All these fictitious employees fall under the scope of the social 
insurances (Articles 4 and 5 ZW, WAO and WW). 
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Table 5: Scope of the social insurances ZW, WAO and WW 
 Employees; 
Article 3 ZW, WAO and 
WW  
Fictitious employees;  
Article 4 ZW, WAO 
and WW 
Fictitious employees;  
Article 5 ZW, WAO and WW 
ZW Employee (natural person, 
younger than 65 years, 
employed in private 
business or public service)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Excluding: ministers, 
secretaries of state, 
ombudsmen and their 
substitutes, public safety 
workers, voluntary 
municipal firemen, 
managing directors and 
domestic staff; excluded 
by Article 6 ZW, WAO and 
WW  
Contractors employed 
by natural persons  
People employed by 
intermediaries  
Certain fishermen  
Students and interns  
Silent partners  
Homeworkers  
Musicians 
Artists 
-Athletes  
People who exchange personal 
labour for financial remuneration 
and work fewer than two days a 
week for the same employer and 
earn less than 40% of the minimum 
wage  
 
Excluding: governors and board 
members, clergymen, 
certain authors and editors; 
excluded by a governmental 
regulation 
WAO Idem ZW Idem ZW  
Excluding: students 
and interns  
Idem ZW 
WW Idem ZW Excluding: students 
and interns  
Idem ZW 
Source: Sociaal-Economische Raad (Social and Economic Council) 2004. 
However, some fictitious employees have been excluded from the social insurances 
through governmental regulation. Fictitious employees like governors and board 
members, clergymen and certain authors and editors are excluded from mandatory 
coverage and participation. Moreover, employees who work in employment relations as 
formulated in Article 6 of ZW, WAO and WW are excluded from the scope of the social 
insurances. Thus, ministers, secretaries of state and national ombudsmen (and their 
substitutes), public safety workers, voluntary municipal firemen, managing directors, 
and domestic workers who work no more than two days per week for a private 
individual do not fall under the scope of the social insurances for employees. This does 
not mean that these workers have no access at all to employment-based social 
insurances. Ministers and secretaries of state have their own reduced pay schemes. 
Managing directors and domestic workers who work no more than two days per week 
for a private individual were treated like self-employed persons and were insured under 
the Self-Employed Persons Disablement Insurance Act. 
The self-employed are always excluded from employee insurance schemes, but 
very often a self-employed person is considered to be a fictitious employee. This is 
especially the case when a self-employed person has a small contract, working fewer 
than two days a week for a certain employer, and earns with that labour less than 40% 
of the minimum wage (Article 5 ZW, WAO and WW). These so-called fictitious 
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employees often consider themselves to be self-employed persons and act according 
to this status. These workers work for different employers, simultaneously or 
consecutively; because they sometimes work on a very regular basis or for a certain 
period of time for the same employer, this labour relation is considered to be one of 
fictitious employment. Even the tax authority treats these workers as self-employed 
entrepreneurs, granting them the tax reductions for entrepreneurs. Only the Employee 
Insurance Implementing Body treats them as fictitious employees with respect to the 
employee insurances. Some self-employed are fictitious employees because they fall 
under the scope of the social insurances. It is sometimes very difficult to distinguish a 
fictitious employee from a self-employed person. The fictitious employee represents a 
grey area between employees and the self-employed. 
Artists and athletes  
Some artists and athletes are employees, others are self-employed. The same social 
security provisions and social insurances apply to these artists and athletes as to other 
employees or self-employed persons. Often it is not easy to decide whether an artist or 
athlete is an employee or a self-employed person. It is especially difficult to determine 
the legal status of artists and athletes who work on a freelance basis or on the basis of 
consecutive short-term fixed contracts of less than three months for different 
employers. A special rule applies to these kinds of artists and athletes: they are 
considered to be fictitious employees, and, although they work on the basis of a short-
term labour contract, the employee insurances do apply to them. Moreover, these 
artists and athletes fall under a different tax regime and pay less income tax than 
employees do. 
Artists even have their own social security provision. The Act on Work and Income 
Provision for Artists (WWIK) was implemented on 1 January 2005 and replaced the Act 
on Income Provision for Artists (WIK). Artists who do not earn enough income to 
support themselves can apply for the WWIK and receive it for four years. They can 
spread these benefits over a period of ten years. However, if an artist receives benefits 
under the WWIK, he or she cannot apply for benefits under the General Supplementary 
Benefits Act. 
3 Social security schemes for employees 
About 86% of the active Dutch workforce are employees. Thus, the employment-based 
insurance schemes apply to a large share of the Dutch population. These employment-
based insurances protect employees against the economic risks of sickness and 
disability, parenthood, old age and unemployment. In the Netherlands, most employee 
insurances deal with the costs and risks of sickness and disability. 
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3.1 The economic risk of sickness and disability  
Many social insurances are aimed at the economic risk of sickness and disability. The 
Health Insurance Act and the General Exceptional Medical Expenses Act deal with the 
costs of medical care. The Sickness Benefit Act (ZW) and the Occupational 
Disablement Insurance Act (WAO) are concerned with the costs of income loss due to 
sickness and disability. The ZW and the WAO are closely interconnected. 
Health insurance 
The Health Insurance Act (ZFW) insures people against the costs of ‘normal’ medical 
care. About 65% of the Dutch population is statutorily insured under the ZFW. People 
who work for a municipality, province or police force (ca. 5%) are insured separately by 
means of a public insurance. The rest of the population—about 30%—are not eligible 
for the ZFW and have taken out private insurance for their healthcare costs. Private 
healthcare insurance varies from one insurance company to the next. The one 
exception to this rule is the standard package of all private healthcare insurance 
companies: it is uniform. A new health insurance regime will be implemented on 
1 January 2006. This new Health Insurance Act will replace both the public and the 
private healthcare insurances. 
The Health Insurance Act applies to (a) all persons under the age of 65 who are in 
paid employment and whose income is below the ceiling of €33,000 per year, (b) all 
self-employed persons under the age of 65 whose taxable income is below €20,800 
per year and (c) recipients of social security benefits up to the age of 65 (e.g. 
beneficiaries of incapacity pensions) if the level of incapacity is over 45%, beneficiaries 
of widows’ or orphans’ pensions and beneficiaries of unemployment benefits. It even 
applies to persons 65 years or older if these persons were insured under this act before 
they reached the age of 65. This insurance is optional for persons 65 years or older if 
their taxable income is below €20,750 per year. 
Everyone who meets the criteria set out in the legislation is automatically insured 
by mandate for healthcare expenses under the Health Insurance Act and must pay the 
statutory contribution. Employers, employees and self-employed persons contribute to 
this insurance. The employer contributes 6.75% of the employee’s gross income to this 
insurance. The employee contributes 1.45% of his or her gross income (as of 
1 January 2005). If a person does not have an employer because he or she is self-
employed, this person contributes 8.20% to this insurance. People older than 65 also 
contribute 8.20% of their benefits received under the General Old-Age Pensions Act, 
but contribute less for any further income received. 
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General Exceptional Medical Expenses Act 
Normal medical costs are covered by the Health Insurance Act and the medical 
expenses insurance. On 1 January 1968 the General Exceptional Medical Expenses 
Act (AWBZ) was established for serious uninsurable medical risks. Parents of a 
severely handicapped child, for example, might face high medical costs for a lifetime. 
The AWBZ covers every Dutch resident and even people who are not residents but 
who work and pay taxes in the Netherlands. Every Dutch resident contributes through 
his or her income taxes to this insurance, paying 13.45% of his or her gross income up 
to €30,357,into this insurance scheme.3 The AWBZ is financed through employee and 
state contributions. As a general social insurance for serious medical risks and medical 
expenses, the AWBZ obliges all residents of the Netherlands to insure themselves 
against the costs of hospitalisation and nursing in the event of chronic illness and/or a 
physical or mental disability. 
Sickness benefit  
As a consequence of the ‘privatisation’ of the Sickness Benefit Act in 1994 and 1996, 
the risk of employee sickness leave has been transferred from the industrial sector as a 
whole to the individual employer. The period of employee sickness leave during which 
the employer must pay the wages of the employee has been extended. Before 1994 
this period was two days. In 1994 it was extended to two or six weeks, depending on 
the size of the company. As of 1 March 1996, the Act on Extending Payment of Wages 
in Case of Sickness prolonged this period to 52 weeks. 
The Gatekeeper Act came into effect on 1 January 2002 and introduced several 
measures to facilitate a speedier intervention in the first year of an employee’s sickness 
leave. On 1 April 2002 the Improved Gatekeeper Act came into force. This act 
tightened the rights and obligations of both the employer and the employee during the 
first 52 weeks of employee sickness leave (MISSOC 2004). Employees who are on 
sickness leave and who refuse to cooperate in efforts to reintegrate them back into 
their own position or an other, suitable position may be dismissed or have their wages 
suspended, providing that the Employee Insurance Implementing Body (UWV) has 
been asked for a second opinion. Employers that do too little to help an employee on 
employee sickness leave re-enter working life may be forced by the UWV to continue 
paying the employee’s wages for up to one year after the first 52 weeks. The UWV is 
responsible for collecting the contributions, assessing claimants’ incapacity for work 
and paying out the benefits. 
With the implementation of the Act on the Extension Period of Continued Wage 
Payment During Sickness on 1 January 2004, the Sickness Benefit Act and the 
Occupational Disablement Insurance Act were again reformed. From this date on, 
employers have been obliged to pay 70% of an employee’s salary for a period of 104 
                                                 
3  See table 2. 
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weeks, rather than the previously arranged 52 weeks of employee sickness leave. 
Most collective labour agreements stipulate that an employer pays 100% of an 
employee’s salary during the first year of employee sickness leave. If the employer 
pays more than 70% of the employee’s last-earned wage during the second year of 
employee sickness leave, the employer can be fined by having the duration that the 
employer has to pay the employee’s wages prolonged. This sanction is introduced to 
prevent that employers pay more than 70% of the employee’s last-earned wage during 
the second year of employee sickness leave: this is only allowed during the first year. 
The aim of the Act on the Extension Period of Continued Wage Payment During 
Sickness is to reduce employee sickness leave, decrease the number of occupational 
disability beneficiaries and give employers an incentive to stimulate their employees on 
sickness leave to resume work (MISSOC 2004). Since 1 January 2004, the period for 
which the employer is responsible for payment of sickness benefit has been extended 
to two years. Thus, most employees in the Netherlands no longer receive sickness 
benefits on the basis of the Sickness Benefit Act. Employers can choose to insure this 
risk on the private insurance market. 
The Sickness Benefit Act remains in force as a safety net for several groups of 
individuals, such as unemployed persons who receive unemployment benefits, 
employees on paid maternity leave, employees who are not able to work due to an 
organ transplantation and individuals with an incapacity for work who have re-entered 
the labour market. The Sickness Benefit Act is still considered to be a social insurance 
because the above-mentioned groups of employees can still apply for benefits under 
this act. These benefits are financed from the Redundancy Payment Fund of the UWV 
and the General Unemployment Funds, and employers continue to pay for this 
insurance in order to create this safety net. The contribution of the employers varies by 
economic sector. Employees do not contribute to this social insurance. A person who 
receives benefits under the Sickness Benefit Act for over two years or whose employer 
has paid his or her wages for over two years of sickness leave becomes eligible for 
occupational disability benefits, but not before the UWV assesses his or her level of 
incapacity (Mudde 1997). 
Occupational disability benefit  
Incapacity for work is defined as an individual’s inability to work as a result of a physical 
or mental disability (Noordam 2004: 202). A person is considered to have a complete 
or partial incapacity for work when, as a result of sickness or infirmity, he or she cannot 
earn the same wage that a healthy worker with similar training and equivalent skills 
normally would earn at the location where he or she works or most recently worked or, 
alternatively, at a comparable location in the vicinity. No distinction is made with 
respect to the cause of incapacity (MISSOC 2004). It does not matter, for instance, 
whether an employee breaks his leg on the work floor or during a skiing trip. There is 
also no distinction made between labour-related risks and social risks: all these risks 
are insured under the Occupational Disablement Insurance Act (WAO). The WAO 
dates from 1967, when it replaced the 1921 Industrial Accidents Act. Since 1967 the 
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WAO has insured employees in the Netherlands against loss of wages due to disability, 
regardless of whether or not the disability relates to the job performed (Knegt 
2001).During the General Disability Benefit Act (AAW), which was implemented in1976 
and abolished in 1998, the WAO was only a supplementary insurance for employees 
on top of the AAW. 
From 1 October 1976 until 1 January 1998 both employees and the self-employed 
were collectively and publicly insured against the risks of long-term incapacity for work 
under the General Disability Benefit Act (AAW). As of 1 January 1998, employees 
under the age of 65 have been insured under the WAO, whereas the self-employed, 
their spouses who work in the business, and professional practitioners under the age of 
65 were insured under the Self-Employed Persons Disablement Insurance Act (WAZ). 
In addition, all Dutch residents under the age of 65 who already suffered from a 
disability when reaching the age of 17 or who have become disabled since that date 
and were students for a period of at least six months in the years immediately prior to 
that date are insured under the Occupational Disablement Assistance Act for 
Handicapped Young Persons. In 2004 the WAO was modernised and the WAZ was 
abolished. 
On the basis of the 1967 WAO, the AAW had the same structure as the WAO: 
people who were unfit for full-time employment for longer than one year received 80% 
of their last-earned income. When a decline in industrial employment in the second half 
of the 1970s led to a mass exodus from the labour market, the social partners, among 
others, used the AAW/WAO scheme to shed redundant personnel under more 
favourable conditions than those provided by the normal unemployment benefit 
scheme. Again the number of AAW/WAO benefit recipients began to rise sharply in the 
early 1980s, and it became clear that both employers and employees were using the 
AAW/WAO as a means to facilitate organisational restructuring. Subsequent 
governments made several cuts; for example, benefits were reduced to 70% and linked 
to the age of the recipient. In those days, the general consensus was that the number 
of AAW/WAO benefit recipients was too high—almost one million people out of a 
workforce of about seven million—and that the AAW/WAO scheme did not do enough 
to reintegrate disabled employees into the labour market. Over the years the Dutch 
government took steps to solve this problem (Kaar 1999; Knegt 2001; MISSOC 2004). 
In 1998, with the re-introduction of the WAO as main insurance against the risk of 
incapacity for work, employers, rather than public funds, were obliged to pay 70% of an 
employee’s wages during the first year of sickness leave. In practice, employers often 
pay 100% of an employee’s wages. The employer’s contribution to the WAO consists 
of two separate components: a basic contribution, which is the same for all employers, 
namely, 5.60% (as of 1 January 2005), and a differentiated contribution, which varies 
by company depending on the number of employees receiving WAO benefits—small 
companies pay the calculated contribution, large companies pay the maximum of 
8.52%. The employer can insure against this risk through a private insurance company 
or can choose to pay for this risk themselves. If an employer decides to take on the 
WAO risk alone, during the first five years it pays only the basic premium of 5.60%. An 
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employer that employs a large number of people with an incapacity for work may claim 
a reduction or remission. 
The WAO entitles employees under the age of 65 to a benefit if they are still at 
least 15% unfit for suitable employment after 52 weeks of incapacity for work. The Self-
Employed Persons Disablement Insurance Act (WAZ) entitled and the Occupational 
Disablement Assistance Act for Handicapped Young Persons (WAJONG) entitle these 
groups of individuals to a benefit if they are at least 25% unfit for suitable employment 
after 52 weeks of incapacity for work. The WAJONG is financed with tax revenues, 
whereas the WAZ was financed by the self-employed themselves. WAZ benefits 
provided 70% of the minimum wage. If the employee is still unable to work after the first 
year of sickness leave, he or she then receives WAO benefits that are financed through 
public funds. Moreover, it has become mandatory for employers to enter into a contract 
with a health and safety service—a commercial company geared to providing support 
for sick employees—which offers the employer consultancy services and an 
assessment of its working conditions policy. Market incentives have also been 
introduced in the form of differentiated contributions: the higher the number of 
employees to enter the WAO scheme, the greater the company’s WAO contribution 
(Kaar 1999). The number of employees that become incapable for work increases the 
WAO contributions, but hiring employees with disability problems decreases the WAO 
contributions. 
On 1 July 2004 the criteria for determining the degree of disability were tightened 
(to a degree of incapacity for work of 35% or more), and all beneficiaries who became 
sick before 1 January 2004 and who are under the age of 45 will be re-assessed under 
the new criteria for the determination of the degree of incapacity for work (MISSOC 
2004). The employer is now also responsible for finding or creating an appropriate 
position for employees with a partial or temporary incapacity for work. This position can 
be a job in the company concerned, adapted to the employee’s capabilities, or another 
job in a different company. The employee should be actively involved in the 
reintegration process and be required to accept a different suitable job, as long as the 
pay is at least 70% of his or her last-earned wage. If the employee’s incapacity for work 
lasts for more than two years and employer and employee efforts do not result in 
securing a new job, or if the employee does not contribute sufficiently to the 
reintegration process, the employee can be dismissed. In this case, employees can 
apply for benefits under a new unemployment benefits scheme. If the employer did not 
do enough to reintegrate the employee or to find alternative work, it is required to 
continue paying the employee’s wages for longer than two years (Grünell 2001; Knegt 
2001). 
If everything goes as planned, a new system for the WAO will be introduced on 
1 January 2006, with the implementation of the Work and Income Act. The Work and 
Income Act is connected with the Act on the Extension Period of Continued Wage 
Payment During Sickness, which prolongs the qualifying period for the WAO from 52 
weeks to 104 weeks. Proposals for a new criterion for the determination of the degree 
of incapacity for work are under consideration. Employees who became incapacitated 
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for work after 1 January 2004 will, after a qualifying period of 104 weeks, be assessed 
for the WAO on the basis of the new criterion for the determination of the degree of 
incapacity for work. The present criterion is based on the loss of earning capacity, 
whereas the new criterion will be based on the concept of capacity for work. 
The Work and Income according to Capacity Act centres on the concept of 
capacity for work rather than incapacity for work. The WAO will only apply to 
employees with a complete and permanent incapacity for work (i.e. a degree of 
incapacity for work of higher than 80%). Employees with a temporary and/or partial 
incapacity for work (i.e. a degree of incapacity for work of between 35% and 80%) 
should find a suitable job or receive unemployment benefits; alternatively, they can 
insure themselves against this risk on the private insurance market (MISSOC 2004). 
The problem with this approach is that these workers will not easily find a job that suits 
their needs, and if they are not receiving WAO benefits they will be dependent on 
entitlements under the Unemployment Benefit Act or, worse, the General 
Supplementary Benefits Act. Thus, the new Work and Income according to Capacity 
Act is not solving the problem, just shifting it. 
3.2 The economic risk of parenthood 
Work and care 
The General Work and Care Act is intended to facilitate the reconciliation of work and 
family responsibilities. The act gives employees the right to work part time, unless the 
employer can demonstrate that considerable company interests necessitate otherwise. 
Up to 1 August 2004, it also gave self-employed women the right to a paid maternity 
leave of at least 16 weeks. Female employees are still entitled to this paid maternity 
leave. The leave is financed through contributions paid by the employers to the 
Sickness Benefit Act. These women receive benefits that compensate 100% of their 
daily wage, though the maximum benefit permitted is €167 per day. 
Child allowance 
The General Child Benefit Act applies to all parents who live in the Netherlands. 
Foreigners who work for a Dutch employer in or outside the Netherlands also can claim 
child benefits. The child allowance is for children, stepchildren and foster children up to 
the age of 18, even when these children live abroad in a European Union country or in 
a country with which the Netherlands concluded an agreement on the verification of 
entitlements. Child benefits are paid on a quarterly basis. In 2004 a parent will receive 
€175 per quarter for children up to 6 years of age, €215 per quarter for children 
between the ages of 6 and 11, and €250 per quarter for children between the ages of 
12 and 18. When a child turns 16, parents only receive child benefits if the child attends 
a regular day school, has an incapacity for work or is officially unemployed. Child 
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benefits for children between the ages of 16 and 18 will be discontinued if the child 
goes to university, pursues higher vocational education or begins to work more than 19 
hours per week. Children are allowed to earn a limited amount of money, however, 
though this may not exceed more than €800 per quarter. 
3.3 The economic risk of old age 
Every person who legitimately stays in the Netherlands and is a resident of the 
Netherlands, whatever his or her nationality, and who is 65 years of age or older 
receives a basic pension paid under the General Old-Age Pensions Act (AOW). All 
persons between the ages of 15 and 65 who live in the Netherlands, whether they 
receive an income or not, are insured under this pension act. Even those who do not 
live in the Netherlands but work and pay taxes there will be insured under the AOW 
scheme. This general pension scheme for all Dutch residents is financed by tax 
contributions on earned income. The premiums for the AOW scheme are income-
related, and every person in the Netherlands with an income pays these premiums. 
The amount a person receives depends on his or her domestic situation and on 
the number of years he or she has been insured under the AOW scheme. If a person 
has lived in the Netherlands continuously from the age of 15 to the age of 65, this 
person will be entitled to a full (100%) pension (50 years, at 2%for each year of 
residence). The full pension is reduced by 2% for each year of non-insurance. The only 
way a person is not insured is when he or she no longer lives in or works and pays 
taxes in the Netherlands. The old-age pension scheme came into effect on 1 January 
1957, with a transitional arrangement for people who were older than 15 in 1957. For 
these people, the years between their fifteenth birthday and 1 January 1957 are treated 
as years of insurance if they have Dutch nationality or if they have lived in the 
Netherlands, the Dutch Antilles or Aruba for six years after their fifty-ninth birthday and 
are living in the Netherlands when they turn 65. 
The entitlements under the AOW are related to the minimum wage. If a person is 
married, the gross amount of the AOW pension is maximised at €631.67 per month; if a 
person is single, this amount is maximised at €921.12 per month; and if a person is a 
single parent and is taking care of children under the age of 18, the maximum gross 
amount is set at €1,141.04 per month (2004 figures). If a person has a partner (spouse 
or other partner) who is under the age of 65, this person will, in principle, be entitled to 
a supplementary allowance on top of his or her pension. The amount of the 
supplementary allowance depends on the partner’s insurance record, and whether he 
or she meets the conditions of the transitional arrangement. Moreover, this 
supplementary allowance depends on the income of the partner. It is payable until the 
partner turns 65. People who turn 65 on or after 1 January 2015 will not be entitled to a 
supplementary allowance for a younger partner. They will receive only a pension at the 
rate of a married person. Most employees—about 90%—have a compulsory 
supplementary pension scheme as well. These compulsory supplementary schemes 
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are based on agreements between the social partners (the employer or employers’ 
organisation and the trade unions) and are part of collective labour agreements. 
3.4 The economic risk of unemployment  
Unemployment, like incapacity for work, means that an individual is not working or 
cannot work. This situation arises because no work is available or because an 
employer does not wish to make work available (Noordam 2004: 202). The economic 
risk of unemployment for employees is covered by the Unemployment Benefit Act. For 
the self-employed, this economic risk is considered to be uninsurable, because a self-
employed person can influence his of her situation of unemployment more than an 
employee can. If an employee is summarily dismissed because of his or her own 
wrongdoing, or if an employee quits voluntarily, this employee will not receive benefits 
under the Unemployment Benefit Act. The contributions required through the 
Unemployment Benefit Act actually fund two separate components of this act: the 
General Unemployment Funds and the Redundancy Payment Funds. The contributions 
to the General Unemployment Funds amount to 7.35% of wages in total, of which 
5.80% is contributed by the employer and 1.55% by the employee. The contributions to 
the Redundancy Payment Funds are paid by the employers alone and amount to 
1.89% of wages. This percentage represents the average contribution; it may vary by 
industry. The Unemployment Benefit Act contributions are maximized at a wage of 
€167 per day, with contribution-free allowances of €58 per day. 
As of 2003, with the implementation of the Act on Abolition of Follow-up 
Unemployment Benefit, employees who become unemployed no longer are entitled to 
a Follow-up Unemployment Benefit (70% of the minimum wage). This benefit had 
followed the wage-related unemployment benefit (70% of the employee’s wage), 
extending coverage for an additional two years. The aim of this act is to stimulate 
unemployed persons to resume work in order to decrease the costs of the 
Unemployment Benefit Act and to prevent employers from using this unemployment 
scheme as an early retirement scheme for older employees. Moreover, as of 1 January 
2004 unemployed persons older than 57.5 years must actively search for jobs, which 
previously was not the case (MISSOC 2004). 
The Unemployment Benefit Act is currently under revision. If everything goes as 
planned, the requirements to qualify for this benefit will be stricter than before. To 
qualify for unemployment benefits, an employee must have worked 26 of the preceding 
36 weeks (before May 2005 it had been 39 weeks). If an employee only meets this 
requirement, the unemployment benefits will last for a maximum duration of three 
months. The first two months the employee will receive 75% of his or her last-earned 
wage and the third month only 70% of his or her last-earned wage. This type of 
unemployment benefit is short-term; if an employee wishes to qualify for long-term 
unemployment benefits, he or she must meet the requirement mentioned above, called 
the ‘weeks requirement’, as well as another requirement, the ‘years requirement’. This 
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requirement is met if an employee has worked at least 52 days in four of the preceding 
five years. If an employee meets both requirements, the unemployment benefit could 
last for a maximum duration of three years and two months (before May 2005 this had 
been five years). For the first two months the employee would receive an 
unemployment benefit of 75% of the last-earned wage, and from the third month on 
70% of the last-earned wage. 
If an older, unemployed or (partially) incapacitated employee does not receive 
enough benefits under the Unemployment Benefit Act or the Occupational Disablement 
Insurance Act to support himself, this person can apply for benefits under the Act on 
Income Provisions for Older, Partially Disabled Unemployed Persons. This social 
security provision raises benefits to the social security provision level of 70% of the 
minimum wage. In the Netherlands the minimum wage is age-related. If a person is 23 
or older and works full time (38 hours per week), the minimum wage is €1,264.80 per 
month (in 2005). 
4 Specific aspects of social protection for the self-
employed 
Although it is true that the self-employed have less social security than employees, 
they are not totally left to their own devices. Like every other Dutch citizen, they can 
receive entitlements under the social security provision schemes. The self-employed 
are insured against the risk of parenthood under the General Child Benefit Act. If 
circumstances make an individual unable to work this person can receive benefits 
under the General Supplementary Benefits Act. A self-employed person could fall back 
on the General Supplementary Benefits Act even in the case of unemployment, but 
then would have to sell or otherwise terminate his or her company. In the Netherlands 
the self-employed have access as well to the residence-based social insurances, such 
as the General Old-Age Pensions Act, which provides financial support in old age; the 
General Surviving Relatives Act, which is a surviving relatives pension. It insures 
people against the risk of losing a spouse or, if the beneficiary is younger than 18, of 
losing a parent. The self-employed also fall under the scope of the General Exceptional 
Medical Expenses Act, which insures against the costs of exceptional medical 
expenses. 
In theory, the self-employed are excluded from all employment-based social 
insurances except the Health Insurance Act. Many self-employed persons fall under 
the scope of this act. Some self-employed persons, however, could apply for benefits 
under the employment-based social insurances, primarily because of their history as an 
employee. If for a certain period of time an employee was insured against sickness 
through the Sickness Benefit Act and against incapacity for work through the 
Occupational Disablement Insurance Act (WAO), then he or she can voluntarily 
continue both insurances as a self-employed person. Other self-employed persons 
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might apply for all three employee insurance schemes—the Sickness Benefit Act, the 
WAO and the Unemployment Benefit Act—because they are regarded as fictitious 
employees by the Employee Insurance Implementing Body. However, most of these 
self-employed persons do not qualify for benefits under these employee insurance 
schemes because they do not meet the requirements. 
4.1 The economic risk of sickness and disability 
In the past, self-employed persons were collectively and publicly insured against the 
risk of long-term incapacity for work. This situation changed only a year ago. 
Employees are still collectively insured in the Netherlands, but the self-employed are 
not. Insurance for the self-employed against the economic risk of long-term incapacity 
for work has been left to the private insurance market. The Sickness Benefit Act is an 
employee insurance and never applied to the self-employed, except in those cases in 
which the self-employed continued their employee insurance on a voluntary basis after 
making the transition from employment to self-employment. All other self-employed 
persons always had to insure on the private insurance market against the economic 
risk of sickness and disability during the first year (and later, first two years) of sickness 
leave, or had to rely on their savings or social safety net, such as their family, spouse 
or partner. 
Health insurances 
The Health Insurance Act applies to all self-employed persons under the age of 65 
whose taxable income is below €20,800 per year. This income is determined as an 
average of the taxable income in the third, fourth and fifth years preceding the year of 
insurance. This requirement was introduced because self-employed persons often 
make more profit in some years than in others. A determination of average income over 
three years helps prevent situations in which a self-employed person is covered by the 
Health Insurance Act one year but the next year is not, thus obliging him or her to 
obtain private health insurance. If a person switches several times between public and 
private health insurance, the premiums of the health insurance tend to rise. Moreover, 
because private insurance companies may subject the self-employed to a medical 
examination, there is always the possibility that a self-employed person may become 
an ‘uninsurable risk’ in the eyes of the private insurance company. A new health 
insurance regime will be implemented on 1 January 2006. This new Health Insurance 
Act will replace both the public and the private healthcare insurances of the self-
employed. Finally, just to note, the General Exceptional Medical Expenses Act applies 
to every Dutch resident and thus also to the self-employed. 
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Self-Employed Persons Disablement Insurance Act 
From 1 October 1976 until 1 August 2004 the self-employed were collectively and 
publicly insured against the risks of long-term incapacity for work, first on the basis of 
the General Disability Benefit Act (AAW) and then, from 1 January 1998 until 1 August 
2004, on the basis of the Self-Employed Persons Disablement Insurance Act (WAZ). 
Both the AAW and the WAZ were mandatory social insurances. The AAW applied to all 
residents of the Netherlands, including the self-employed. The WAZ was mandatory for 
the self-employed; freelancers; employees who are excluded from the employee 
insurance schemes, such as managing directors and domestic workers; fictitious 
employees such as homeworkers and fishermen; and fictitious employees who are 
excluded from the employee insurance schemes, such as writers and editors. To 
ensure that even self-employed persons with a low risk of incapacity for work insured 
themselves against these risks, participation in the disablement insurance scheme was 
mandatory. 
Approximately one million self-employed persons were insured under the WAZ. 
This group consisted of about 600,000 to 700,000 self-employed persons (of which 
90,000 to 130,000 were managing directors) and about 300,000 professionals, such as 
dentists, midwives, barristers and solicitors (Boot 2004: 152–154). The group of WAZ-
insured persons (ca. one million) was larger than the group of self-employed (540,000) 
because certain groups of employees and fictitious employees were also insured under 
the WAZ. More WAZ premiums were received than WAZ benefits paid. The WAZ fund 
contained over one billion euros on 1 January 2004 (Lagerveld, Minderhout & Zwinkels 
2004: 8) In 2002 about 57,000 people received benefits under the WAZ, and the 
number was declining (UWV 2003). Two-thirds of WAZ beneficiaries received benefits 
longer than five years (LISV 2000), which means that they already received these 
benefits under the General Disability Benefit Act. Most likely these beneficiaries were 
not self-employed at all, but were employees whenthey became incapacitated for work. 
The benefits of the WAZ were maximised at the social security provision level, 
which is 70% of the minimum wage. In fact, however, these benefits were gradual and 
amounted to—according to the degree of disability—between 21% and 70% of the 
minimum wage. If the self-employed earned an income below the minimum wage, the 
WAZ benefits would be 70% of that income. The premiums for the WAZ were income-
based, and the scheme had a qualifying period of 52 weeks (i.e. the first year of 
illness). After this qualifying period, the insurance offered self-employed persons 
entitlement to benefits equal to 70% of the minimum wage. In cases of maternity leave, 
the insurance paid out 100% of the minimum wage for a period of 16 weeks. The 
qualifying period of 52 weeks meant that self-employed persons were not insured 
against the risks of long-term incapacity for work in their first year of illness. If the self-
employed wanted to insure against this risk, they had to find an insurer on the private 
market. If the self-employed wanted a supplementary insurance on top of the WAZ, 
they had to purchase it on the private insurance market as well. A considerable number 
of self-employed persons insured themselves on the private market against the risk of 
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(long-term) occupational disability in the first year; many also purchased a 
supplementary insurance for the latter years from a private insurance company. 
On 1 August 2004 the WAZ was abolished. The act has been abolished in the 
sense that, since 1 January 2004, no one pays premiums any longer for this insurance 
and, since 1 August 2004, no new persons receive benefits through this insurance 
(after the qualifying period of one year; thus, to be more precise, as of 1 August 2005). 
Individuals who already receive benefits under the WAZ will continue to receive these 
benefits. The act was abolished because none of the parties involved were pleased 
with the act: the premiums were considered to be too high in relation to the 
entitlements provided under the insurance. According to the Dutch government, the 
main reason for its abolishment is that it is relatively easy for the self-employed to 
insure against the risk of long-term incapacity for work through private insurance 
companies, and that many already do so (Noordam 2004: 150–152). It is thought that 
occupational disability insurance for the self-employed should not be a public concern, 
but rather be a matter of the self-employed themselves (Lagerveld, Minderhoud & 
Zwinkels 2004: 9). Data show, however, that in 2001 only 40% to 50% of the self-
employed insured themselves against the risks of sickness and incapacity for work on 
the private insurance market. The majority of the self-employed that did not insure 
themselves said that they did not do so because private insurance is too expensive. In 
2002, the average premium of a private insurance was about €300 per month (Evers, 
De Muijnck & Overweel 2002). 
Act on Income Provisions for Older, Partially Disabled Formerly Self-Employed 
If an older, unemployed and partially incapacitated self-employed person did not 
receive enough benefits under the Self-Employed Persons Disablement Insurance Act 
(WAZ) to support himself, this person could apply for benefits under the Act on Income 
Provisions for Older, Partially Disabled Formerly Self-Employed Persons (IOAZ). This 
social security provision raised the benefits to the social security provision level of 70% 
of the minimum wage. The individual had to receive benefits under the WAZ in order to 
be eligible for benefits under the IOAZ. When the WAZ was abolished, so too were the 
IOAZ for new beneficiaries and the paid maternity leave for self-employed women. 
Alternative social insurance 
The Dutch government abolished the WAZ, but created an alternative social insurance 
against the risk of incapacity for work. It did this because many self-employed persons 
were rejected by insurance companies when they applied for a private occupational 
disability insurance. Private insurance companies are not obliged, as they say, to 
insure ‘burning houses’, and thus tend to turn down people on the basis of their age or 
medical history. If an insurance company does insure a person with a medical history, it 
tends to demand a longer qualifying period than usual, raise the premiums or even 
exclude certain illnesses or complaints. 
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This alternative insurance against the risk of long-term occupational disability is 
voluntary, and only certain groups of self-employed persons can sign up for it: self-
employed persons who insurance companies consider uninsurable because of their 
age or medical background, people who receive WAZ benefits and lost these benefits 
because they are considered fit to work, and people who were not able to buy a private 
occupational disability insurance that insures them until the age of 65. The insurance 
has a qualifying period of two years and only pays out benefits when a person has no 
capacity at all for work. If the self-employed person still has some capacity for work, he 
or she will not receive any benefits. The benefits may not exceed €11,500 per year (in 
2004), and the premiums for this insurance are rather high, at somewhere between 
€2,000 and €2,500 per year (in 2004). 
Some people argue that this alternative insurance is a bogus insurance. The 
premiums are very high in relation to the entitlements under the insurance; in fact, they 
are even higher than the WAZ premiums. The only difference between this insurance 
and the General Supplementary Benefits Act is that the self-employed beneficiary does 
not have to sell or otherwise terminate his or her company. 
Voluntary continuation of the employee insurance schemes 
If a self-employed person worked in the past as an employee, he or she can continue 
the employee insurance schemes against the risks of sickness and incapacity for work 
on a voluntary basis. To qualify for this voluntary continuation of the schemes, the self-
employed person must have been insured through the Sickness Benefit Act and the 
Occupational Disablement Insurance Act (WAO) for a period of three years. In addition, 
the self-employed person must make this decision within four weeks of his or her 
transition from employment to self-employment. Only 6% of the self-employed are 
voluntarily insured under the Sickness Benefit Act and the WAO. Under these 
schemes, they receive benefits after just three days of sickness leave, and the benefits 
amount to 70% of the insured wage, though this amount may not exceed €165 per day. 
The premiums for these insurances are paid by the self-employed themselves and 
correspond to 5.33% of the insured wage for the Sickness Benefit Act and 7.43% of the 
insured wage for the WAO. The Employee Insurance Implementing Body does not 
actively promote this voluntary continuation of the employee insurance schemes 
(Lagerveld, Minderhoud & Zwinkels 2004: 9–10). 
4.2 The economic risk of parenthood 
With the abolition of the Self-Employed Persons Disablement Insurance Act (WAZ), the 
paid maternity leave for self-employed women also was abolished. Up to August 2004 
self-employed women were entitled to 16 weeks of paid maternity leave on the basis of 
the General Work and Care Act. The entitlements were paid from the WAZ fund. 
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During these 16 weeks self-employed women received 100% of the minimum wage, or 
less if they earned less than the minimum wage. 
Since August 2004, self-employed women must pay for their maternity leave 
themselves if they wish to take time off around their pregnancy. To justify this change 
in legislation, the Dutch government argued that it is easy to insure for paid maternity 
leave on the private insurance market. But in making this argument, the government 
failed to address the fact that the insurance companies use a qualifying period of two 
years for paid maternity leave. The Equal Treatment Commission already has ruled 
that this qualifying period is in contravention of the General Equal Treatment Act and 
the directive 86/613/EEG. The Minister of Social Affairs and Employment has promised 
to consult with the Equal Treatment Commission and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) about how to insure the need for a paid maternity leave. The 
minister is also of the opinion that the abolition of public insurance for this risk was 
appropriate (Asscher-Vonk 2004: 433–435). One benefit for self-employed persons with 
children now remains: the General Child Benefit Act, as a social security provision that 
applies to all parents, also provides benefits to parents who are self-employed. 
4.3 The economic risk of old age 
In the Netherlands all residents, and thus, too, the self-employed, are entitled to a basic 
pension scheme under the General Old-Age Pensions Act. Some self-employed 
persons qualify for entitlements under the supplementary pension schemes. Pension 
funds run the pension scheme for everyone who falls under the scope of the pension 
fund. If a person falls under the scope of a pension fund, the pension scheme of that 
pension fund is mandatory. Self-employed plasterers, terrazzo workers and persons 
working in the stone industry, for example, fall under the scope of the pension fund of 
the construction industry (Kamerstukken II, 2000–2001 27 686, no. 5, p. 6). The 
Mandatory Participation in an Additional Branch Pension Fund Act stipulates that self-
employed carpenters, joiners, metalworkers, steelworkers and painters are obliged to 
take part in their branch pension funds. The Mandatory Participation in an Additional 
Occupational Pension Act stipulates that self-employed general practitioners, medical 
specialists, apothecaries, dentists, midwives, veterinary surgeons, physiotherapists, 
actuaries, exchange brokers, lawyers, notaries and ship pilots must take part in the 
occupational pension scheme that has been set up by their particular occupational 
group. The additional pension scheme of the ship pilots includes an occupational 
disability insurance (Schoukens 2000: 203). Self-employed persons who have worked 
in the past as an employee can continue the mandatory supplementary pension 
scheme belonging to their branch or enterprise on a voluntary basis. 
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4.4 The economic risk of unemployment 
If an employee makes the transition to self-employment, he does not immediately lose 
his rights to certain employment-based social insurances, such as that provided under 
the Unemployment Benefit Act. He keeps his right to unemployment benefits for the 
first eighteen months after he started up his own company. He can, if necessary, regain 
his rights as an employee to unemployment benefits, but if he does so he must 
terminate or sell his company in order to gain access to these benefits. 
If the self-employed person does not have a background as an employee, he or 
she is not insured against the risk of unemployment. The Unemployment Benefit Act 
applies only to employees. Even private insurance companies consider the risk of 
unemployment uninsurable for self-employed persons. Thus, in the event of 
unemployment, the self-employed must fall back on their savings or on the income of 
their spouse or partner or, if they are willing to sell or close their company, they can fall 
back on the General Supplementary Benefits Act. 
5  Certain aspects of social protection in practice 
5.1 The borderline between employees and the self-employed 
Many studies point out that a grey area exists between dependent employment and 
self-employment. Some types of labour are considered grey because they do not easily 
fit into the binary system of employment and self-employment. They do not fit because 
they display characteristics of both employment and self-employment. The ILO (2003) 
refers to these types of labour as objectively ambiguous employment relationships. 
Adalberto Perulli has called them ‘difficult-to-classify forms of employment’. Other types 
of labour are exist in this grey zone because they appear to be self-employment but are 
in fact dependent employment. The ILO (2003) refers to these types of labour as 
disguised employment relations. Perulli calls them ‘falsely self-employed persons’ 
(2003: 14–15). 
In the Netherlands the binary system of employment and self-employment is 
diffused through the notion of the fictitious employee. Very often individuals who 
consider themselves to be self-employed persons are regarded as fictitious employees 
as far as the social insurances are concerned. The binary system is also diffused 
through the voluntary continuation of employee insurance schemes by former 
employees who have made the transition from employment to self-employment. 
27 
5.2 Benefits entitlement revisited 
In the past many people who considered themselves to be self-employed were 
treated by the Employee Insurance Implementing Body as fictitious employees, 
meaning that they and their employers had to pay premiums for the employee 
insurance schemes. This situation caused problems for these self-employed persons. 
For one, potential employers did not want to hire them because often they did not know 
whether the self-employed person was really self-employed or a fictitious employee. 
These potential employers feared that they might have to pay premiums for the 
employee insurance schemes or even fines if they had not paid these premiums. In 
addition, even when the self-employed and their employers paid the premiums for the 
employee insurance schemes, these self-employed persons hardly benefited from 
these insurances because they almost never qualified for the schemes. 
With the introduction of the Statement of Work Relationship (VAR) in 2002, the 
Dutch government tried to solve these problems faced by self-employed persons who 
are regarded as fictitious employees, and even tried to promote self-employment. The 
VAR is a voluntary declaration issued by the tax authorities on request, which is meant 
to provide clarity on both the legal status of the employed and any obligation to insure 
under the employee insurance schemes. This declaration was introduced because self-
employed individuals and their employers would like to be certain in advance about the 
manner in which their employment relationship will be assessed by the tax authorities 
and the Employee Insurance Implementing Body (UWV). Moreover, the self-employed 
and their employers would like to have a definitive answer as to whether they are 
obliged to pay premiums for employee insurance schemes. 
In principle, the self-employed would have certainty about their status in advance 
were it not for the fact that the UWV can assess employment relations in retrospect and 
conclude that the self-employed individual in question was in fact a fictitious employee. 
In such cases, retrospective collection of income taxes takes place and the employee 
insurance scheme premiums are recovered from the self-employed person, unless the 
employer of the individual in question could reasonably have assumed that the labour 
performed was in a relationship of employment and not independent labour. An 
employer could reasonably be expected to know that a self-employed individual is an 
employee if this individual previously worked as an employee for the same employer or 
if the individual performed the same work as an employee in the service of the same 
employer. Under such circumstances, retrospective collection of income taxes takes 
place, and the employee insurance scheme premiums are recovered from the 
employer. 
In practice, whereas the UWV never has imposed retrospective collection on the 
self-employed, it always has done so on the employers of these self-employed 
individuals. This policy pursued by the UWV has made employers hesitant about 
engaging the services of self-employed individuals, thus detracting from one of the 
most important objectives of the Statement of Work Relationship (VAR). Although the 
objective of the VAR is to provide self-employed individuals with more security in 
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advance, so that they are in a better position to bring in more work, the policy of the 
UWV actually costs them work. 
In order to tackle these problems, an act extending the effects of the VAR was 
introduced on 1 January 2005. The most important component of this act is that no 
retrospective collection affecting either the self-employed or the employer takes place if 
it appears in retrospect that the self-employed individual was in fact a fictitious 
employee—unless, of course, a possible case of fraud is involved. In addition, the VAR 
of the self-employed individual can be reconsidered. If deemed an employee, the self-
employed person may no longer seek recourse to employee insurance schemes under 
the Sickness Benefit Act, the Occupational Disablement Insurance Act (WAO) or the 
Unemployment Benefit Act, as this ‘employee’ did not pay any premiums for these 
employee insurance schemes. Before the introduction of the act extending the effects 
of the VAR, an individual’s status as ‘employee’ was sufficient to gain access to the 
schemes under the Sickness Benefit Act, the WAO or the Unemployment Benefit Act. 
The payment or non-payment of employee insurance scheme premiums did not play a 
role. Whether or not premiums have been paid is now an important precondition if 
recourse to employee insurance schemes is sought.
Because employee insurance scheme premiums no longer can be collected in 
retrospect, the tax authorities have to monitor the employment relationships of the self-
employed more closely. To this end, the VAR’s term of validity has been reduced from 
two years to one. Secondly, the VAR of the self-employed individual is checked after 
the year has passed on the basis of the income tax return submitted by the person in 
question. If the tax return deviates from the VAR, the VAR will be revised. Thirdly, the 
application form for the VAR has become more comprehensive. The tax authorities 
now explicitly ask (a) whether the self-employed individual concerned has worked in 
the past as an employee for his or her employer and (b) whether the individual has 
carried out the same activities as a self-employed individual for an employer as those 
carried out by employees and (c) whether the employer is a secondment or a 
temporary employment agency. The tax authorities now also pay closer attention to 
aspects of entrepreneurship when assessing the employment relationships of the self-
employed. 
These efforts will prevent some self-employed individuals from being considered 
employees in retrospect. Yet, despite this stricter monitoring, it will continue to be 
difficult to distinguish between fictitious employees and the self-employed on the basis 
of the VAR alone. This problem relates to the way in which the VAR is assessed: the 
VAR is issued in advance on the basis of all the employment relations that the self-
employed individual anticipates within that year, and not on the basis of each separate 
employment relationship. 
Self-employed individuals have been given some security in the sense that they 
should receive more work now that employers need not fear possible retrospective 
collection of income taxes and employee insurance scheme premiums. It remains to be 
seen, however, whether such security for employers weighs up against the additional 
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risks for the self-employed, who no longer have access to employee insurance 
schemes. If deemed to be employees in retrospect, self-employed individuals will have 
no access to employee insurance schemes, because it will be clear from the VAR 
issued in advance that they are self-employed and thus have not paid premiums for the 
employee insurance schemes. 
Organisations that represent the self-employed are enthusiastic about the act 
extending the effects of the VAR, because it gives the self-employed and their 
employers the security that they long have been asking for. Having obtained a 
guarantee that the Employee Insurance Implementing Body no longer can collect 
insurance scheme premiums in retrospect, employers no longer will be hesitant about 
engaging the services of a self-employed person. In turn, this arrangement gives the 
self-employed the security they want: the guarantee that they can work. 
The relevant question now is why only 60,000 workers per year apply for a VAR, 
which is a voluntary declaration (Sociaal-Economische Raad, 2004). There are about 
540,000 self-employed persons in total, which means that only 11% of the self-
employed apply for a VAR. The Social and Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische 
Raad) expects that the number of applicants will increase as a result of this new act, 
and anticipates that 180,000 workers, or 33% of the self-employed, will apply for a 
VAR. What this expectation is based on is not clear. This estimate corresponds with 
the belief that one out of three self-employed persons is a pseudo employee. 
6 Concluding remarks 
In the Netherlands the difference in levels of protection and compensation between 
employees and the self-employed goes back to the legal distinction between these two 
types of workers. The employee and the employer have an authoritative labour 
relationship, based on subordination. The legal definition of dependent employment is 
that an employer is entitled to instruct a worker as to how the work is carried out and to 
ensure that good conduct is maintained within the company (Article 7:660 of the Civil 
Code). A self-employed person is considered an equal to the employer and therefore 
does not need to be protected against and compensated for the labour-related risks of 
unemployment and incapacity for work. Thus, the most important distinction between 
employees and self-employed persons is that employees are legally subordinate to 
their employer, whereas self-employed persons are not. Employees are considered to 
be legally subordinate to and economically dependent on their employer, and therefore 
need to be protected with social insurances. The self-employed do not require 
protection, and, in theory, the employee insurance schemes do not apply to the self-
employed because the self-employed are not legally subordinate to and economically 
dependent on one employer or one employment relation. In fact, they are supposed to 
divide labour-related risks over several, preferably more than three, employers. 
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Although employers do not compensate the labour-related risks of the self-
employed, the tax authority does compensate for the cost of these risks. The premiums 
that a self-employed person pays for a private insurance against the costs and risks of 
sickness and incapacity for work are tax-deductible. And if a self-employed person is 
saving for his or her old age, these savings can be deducted from his or her income 
taxes. Even investments may be tax-deductible. The tax authority compensates the 
self-employed through tax reductions. In view of these advantages, perhaps there is no 
need for a compensating employer. 
There has been a good deal of discussion in the past about whether or not a self-
employed person should enjoy the same protection against social risks and labour-
related risks as employees do. For a long time many believed that both the self-
employed and employees should enjoy the same protection. When the Self-Employed 
Persons Disablement Insurance Act was implemented in 1998, it was still considered 
undesirable to have the self-employed make their own decisions about whether or not 
they would insure themselves against the risk of long-term incapacity for work 
(Asscher-Vonk 2004). Only six years later, this decision has been left to the self-
employed after all. In the past the policy was to include the self-employed in the 
employee insurances schemes, whereas nowadays it seems that the policy is to 
exclude the self-employed from employee insurances schemes (Berg 2004: 193). 
The mandatory Self-Employed Persons Disablement Insurance Act was abolished, 
and the risk of incapacity for work has been left to the private insurance market. This 
recent trend mirrors a larger trend in the Netherlands, namely, the modernisation and 
privatisation of the social security regime. More and more has been left to the social 
partners and private markets. The risks of the self-employed, however, are thought to 
be even easier to insure on the private market than the risks of employees. This belief 
explains why the privatisation of insurances is progressing more rapidly for the self-
employed than for employees. 
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